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One of the main implications of the New Economic Geography, developed since the 
1990s, is that a temporary shock can create a persistent impact on the geographic 
distribution of economic activities because of multiple equilibria. This paper 
investigates the long-run impact of a temporary shock on the geographic distribution of 
industries in Tokyo Prefecture, Japan, using the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 as a 
natural experiment. It is revealed that the temporary shock from the Great Kanto 
Earthquake was basically dissipated by 1936, just before the full-scale war with China 
broke out. On the other hand, through industry-level investigation, it is found that with 
respect to the machinery and metal industry, the impact was persistent and remained 
even in 1936. These findings suggest the importance of the industrial structure and 
transaction networks within industry in the mechanism determining geographic 
distribution of industries. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important innovations in economics since the 1990s is the development 
of the New Economic Geography (NEG). The NEG models the endogenous mechanism 
of various geographical phenomena, including urbanization and industrial 
agglomeration.1 
The NEG has stimulated empirical studies to test its implications, one of which is 
that a temporary shock can create a persistent impact on the geographic distribution of 
economic activities because of multiple equilibria. Several studies have examined this 
proposition by studying the temporary shocks created by wars. 
Davis and Weinstein focused on the growth of cities in Japan after the bombing 
during the World War II.2 It was found that the destruction that resulted from the 
bombing did not produce a long-run impact on city growth in Japan, which means that 
multiple equilibria were not supported. They then proposed a more direct test on 
multiple equilibria, which they applied to the Japanese bombing data, and once again 
found no support for multiple equilibria.3 
Following Davis and Weinstein, Brakman et al. investigated the impact of World 
War II bombing on the growth of German cities, and found that the bombing created a 
temporary, but not persistent impact on city growth in Germany.4 Meanwhile, Miguel 
and Roland focused on the effects of the bombing that took place during the Vietnamese 
War, and found that the bombing did not produce a long-run impact.5 These  studies  are 
basically negative to the existence of multiple equilibria, but recently Bosker et al. 
applied the direct test for multiple equilibria by Davis and Weinstein to the German 
bombing data to obtain positive evidence.6 
This paper aims to contribute to this literature in three ways. First, the focus is 
on the effects of a natural disaster rather than the effects of a war for a temporary shock. 
The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake that devastated Tokyo is the natural disaster 
selected for this study. As the bombings were “strategic,” they may not have been 
completely exogenous. On the other hand, an earthquake is completely exogenous, and 
is considered to be a natural experiment in a narrow sense. In addition, as shown below, 
the shock of the Great Kanto Earthquake was extremely large. Second, ward- and 
county-level data of Tokyo Prefecture are used. The preceding literature that focuses on 
a temporary shock rejected the possibility of a long-run impact of a temporary shock, 
based on nationwide, city-level or district-level data.7 However, even if the nationwide 
geographic distribution of the population and economic activities are determined by the 
fundamental conditions and, hence, a temporary shock has no long-run impact, it is 
possible that a temporary shock gives a long-run impact within a more limited area. In 
such a case, the variation of fundamental conditions, such as proximity to the coast and 
river, are supposed to be smaller, hence the existing equilibrium of geographic 
distribution of economic activities within it is less stable. In addition, the case of the 
Great Kanto Earthquake is useful to identify the shift of equilibrium, because not only 
                                                  
1  Fujita et al., The Spatial. 
2  Davis and Weinstein, “Bones.” 
3  Davis and Weinstein, “A Search.” 
4  Brakman et al., “The strategic.” 
5  Miguel and Roland, “The long run.” 
6  Bosker et al., “Looking for.” 
7 On the other hand, Redding et al. found that division of Germany after WWII, which 
was supposed to be permanent, shifted the location of the airport hub from Berlin to 
Frankfurt even after the reunification of West and East Germany. The effect of a 
permanent border change is also found by Nakajima in the case of independence of 
Korea from Japan in 1945 (Nakajima, “Economic.”)  2
did those fundamental natural conditions not change due to the earthquake, but the 
physical infrastructure, including public transportation, also recovered swiftly after the 
earthquake.8  Third, the industry-level impact of the earthquake is observed. As the 
technologies and industrial structures were different across industries, any long-run 
impacts of the temporary shock may differ across industries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
damage caused by the Great Kanto Earthquake, and the subsequent reconstruction 
policy. Section 3 describes the changes seen over time in the geographic distribution of 
industries in Tokyo Prefecture. Section 4 econometrically analyses the long-run impact 
of the earthquake on industrial agglomeration. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Great Kanto Earthquake and Reconstruction 
At 11:58 am on September 1, 1923, a huge earthquake with a magnitude of M 7.9 hit the 
southern area of the Kanto district in Japan. This earthquake, the Great Kanto 
Earthquake, was the worst natural disaster in the history of Japan. The damage 
extended over seven prefectures: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaraki, Shizuoka, 
and Yamanashi, centering on Tokyo and Kanagawa. The total number of deaths and 
missing persons was more than 100,000,9 which was 16 times greater than the losses 
from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. In addition, more than 460,000 buildings were 
completely burnt or destroyed.10 The human and physical damage was concentrated in 
the prefectures of Tokyo and Kanagawa (Table 1, Table 2, Figure 1, Figure 2). The main 
reason for such a large amount of damage was the great fire caused by the earthquake. 
While the fire itself generated strong winds, the destruction of the water supply system 
caused by the earthquake severely impeded the fire-fighting capability, which, in turn, 
resulted in tremendous fire damage.11 
 
Table 1, Table 2, Figure 1, Figure 2 
 
It is notable that within Tokyo Prefecture there was substantial variation in the 
damage. At the time, Tokyo Prefecture was composed of Tokyo City and eight counties.12 
Tokyo City, in turn, was composed of 15 wards. Figure 2 indicates the burnt ratio (the 
number of buildings completely burnt or destroyed divided by the total number of 
buildings just before the earthquake) by city and county in Tokyo Prefecture. As can be 
seen, the damage was concentrated on Tokyo City, in the southeast part of Tokyo 
Prefecture. Of the 15 wards of Tokyo City, those that were located in the east part of the 
city were most seriously damaged. Indeed, in the six wards13 in that part, burnt ratios 
were higher than 80% (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
                                                  
8  Railways were seriously damaged by the earthquake, but by October 1923, most of the 
major railway lines were reconstructed by the activities of the engineer brigade (Social 
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Taisho, pp. 439–441). The Yokohama Port 
was also reconstructed by 1925 (Society for Research on the Recovery, Teito, p. 2123). 
9 Here, the number of deaths and missing persons include those who died from the 
quake itself and those who died from the fire caused by the earthquake. 
10 Here, “destroyed” refers to “directly destroyed by the quake,” while “burnt” refers to 
“burnt by the fire caused by the earthquake.” 
11  Tokyo City Government, Teito, p. 28. 
12  Besides them, there was a small city, Hachioji City, as well as islands. In 1932, Tokyo 
City merged five counties and reorganized them into twenty new wards. 
13  These wards are Kanda, Nihonbashi, Kyobashi, Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa.  3
 
The Tokyo City Government estimated the total amount of the physical damage 
in the seven prefectures (Table 3). According to the estimation, a large part of the 
damage consisted of commodities, buildings, and household goods. The total amount of 
the damage was 5,506 million yen, which is equivalent to 6,168 billion yen (65.6 billion 
dollars) at 1995 prices,14 when the Kobe Earthquake occurred. This is 62.1% of the 
damage caused by the Kobe Earthquake,15 but in terms of the percentage of GNP 
(GDP), the damage caused by the Great Kanto Earthquake was far greater than the 
damage caused by the Kobe Earthquake. That is, while the ratio of the Kobe 
Earthquake damage to GDP in 1994 was 2.1%, the ratio of the Great Kanto Earthquake 
damage to GNP in 1922 was 35.4%.16 
We can also compare the magnitude of the damage from the Great Kanto 
Earthquake with that from World War II, on which Davis and Weinstein focused.17 
According to the estimation by the Economic Stabilization Board, the total amount of 
physical damage was 4,245 billion yen at 1948 prices,18 which is equivalent to 33,505 
billion yen (356 billion dollars) at 1995 prices. The ratio of the war damage to GNP in 
1940 is 108.5%.19 This ratio is around three times larger than that of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake. However, it should be remembered that the damage of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake concentrated on Tokyo Prefecture and Kanagawa Prefecture. Indeed, the 
ratio for Tokyo Prefecture in terms of buildings completely destroyed or burnt by the 
earthquake was 39.8%, while the equivalent ratio for the World War II was 31.4% (Table 
2, Economic Stabilization Board, p. 344). In this sense, with respect to Tokyo Prefecture, 




Just after the Great Kanto Earthquake, the government began to draw up a 
reconstruction plan. A new government agency that was to be in charge of the plan, the 
Agency of Imperial Capital Reconstruction (Teito Fukko-in), was established in 
September 1923. However, because of the pressure on the Diet to reduce expenditures, 
the governmental draft plan was curtailed, and the Agency of Imperial Capital 
Reconstruction was abolished in 1924. It was succeeded in its role by the Bureau of 
Reconstruction, which was newly established in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and a 
reconstruction project was implemented. A distinctive feature of the reconstruction plan 
was that it was drawn up as a part of the city plan. The City Planning Law and the City 
Area Architecture Law had been already legislated in 1919,20 and, in accordance with 
these two laws, the government had prepared a city plan for Tokyo before the 
                                                  
14 To convert the 1923 values to 1995 values, we used a series of deflators, linking the 
GNP(GDP) deflators of Ohkawa et al., Kokumin Shotoku, the Economic Planning 
Agency, Kokumin Shotoku, and the Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Keizai. 
15  According to the estimation by Hyogo Prefecture, the total amount of damage caused 
by the Kobe Earthquake was 9,927 billion yen (webpage of Kobe News Paper, http:// 
www.kobe-np.co.jp/sinsai/kiroku/higai0012.html). 
16  Nominal GNP in 1922 was 15,573 million yen (Ohkawa et al., Kokumin Shotoku). 
17  Davis and Weinstein, “Bones”; and “A search.” 
18 Economic Stabilization Board, Taiheiyo. The original Japanese name of the agency 
was Keizai Antei Honbu. Although Davis and Weinstein refer to it as the Central 
Economic Stabilization Board (“Bones”), here we use the official English name. 
19  The war damage at 1940 prices was 42.76 billion yen, while the nominal GNP in 1940 
was 39.40 billion yen (Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Shotoku). 
20 Ishida,  Nihon, pp. 114143; and Koshizawa, Tokyo, pp. 1323.  4
earthquake, but it was not implemented. This city plan was then incorporated to be 
implemented in the reconstruction plan.21 
It is notable that the city plan included zoning regulations.22 The City Area 
Architecture Law prescribed three categories of zones: the residential zone, the 
commercial zone, and the industrial zone. With respect to factories, the following 
regulations were imposed in these zones.23  In a residential zone, factories using motors 
of greater than 3 hp were prohibited, whereas in a commercial zone, factories using 
motors of greater than 15 hp were prohibited. In addition, a factory that had dangers or 
inconveniences such as a risk of explosion, discharging harmful or pungent gases or 
liquids, discharging a significant amount of dust, or generating noise or vibrations, was 
prohibited in both residential and commercial zones. With respect to industrial zones, 
factories were identified that could only be allowed in that zone. A factory using motors 
of greater than 50 hp or a factory with one of the above dangers or inconveniences was 
only allowed in an industrial zone. Besides these three zones, there was also a “zone not 
yet specified.” In this zone, a factory using motors of 50 hp or less was allowed. For 
Tokyo City, zoning was determined in 1925 and revised in both 1929 and 1935.24 In 
evaluating the long-run impact of an earthquake on industrial growth, control and the 
effects of zoning should be considered. 
 
3. Impact of Earthquake on Industrial Agglomeration within Tokyo 
Next, we focus on the impact of the earthquake on industries within Tokyo Prefecture. 
Table 4 details the changes over time in the distribution of industries. The shares of 
industrial workers to the total number of industrial workers in Tokyo Prefecture are 
indicated for the fifteen wards of Tokyo City, and for the five neighboring counties, 
which were merged into Tokyo City in 1932. 
First, it can be seen just how large the temporary shock of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake was. The total number of workers declined by 35% from 1922 to 1923. 
Second, the shock varied substantially across wards and counties. Four wards in the 
southeast downtown area, Kanda, Kyobashi, Honjo, and Fukagawa, were extremely 
damaged. These wards had been an agglomeration area of industries before the 
earthquake, but they lost more than 50% of their shares of industrial workers. On the 
other hand, the shares of counties increased substantially. In this sense, the earthquake 
changed the geographic distribution of industries in Tokyo Prefecture substantially, at 
least temporarily. Finally, it is notable that a part of this change seems to have been 
persistent. In the four wards that were seriously damaged, more than half of the decline 
in the shares from 1922 to 1923 still remained in 1936, even though the Japanese 




Table 5 shows the shares of industrial workers by ward and county with respect 
to the two largest industries in Tokyo, namely the textile industry and the machinery 
and metal industry. The great magnitude of the temporary shock and its persistence are 
also observed in the data from the individual industries. Another interesting 
                                                  
21 Takebe,  Teito, pp. 4445; and Tokyo City Government, Shinsai, p. 94. 
22  This was the first time zoning had been implemented in Tokyo City. 
23 Yano, Kojo, pp. 40172. The regulations were revised several times. The following 
was the regulation in 1932. 
24 Horiuchi,  Toshi, pp. 5670. 
25 Concerning the macroeconomy in Japan in this period, see Nakamura, Economic 
Growth and Cha “Did Korekiyo.”  5
observation is that the persistence seems to be stronger for the machinery and metal 
industry than for the textile industry. With respect to the textile industry, the share of 
workers declined by more than 50% from 1922 to 1923 for seven wards, but for four of 
the wards, more than half of the decline had been recovered by 1936. On the other hand, 
with respect to the metal and machinery industry, the shares of workers declined more 
than 50% from 1922 to 1923 for three wards, and more than half of the decline still 




4. Testing the persistence of the impact 
Observations in the previous section suggest that the Great Kanto Earthquake might 
have a persistent impact on the geographic distribution of industries. We now examine 
the persistence quantitatively. For this purpose, we first employ the interrupted time 
series analysis.26  We estimate the following equation: 
 
SHARErt = Xr*AFTERt + Xr*QUAKETRENDt + r + rBASETRENDt.  (1) 
 
The dependent variable, SHARErt, represents the share of ward or county r of the total 
workers in Tokyo Prefecture in year t. We basically decompose it into two items, namely 
share levels specific to individual wards and counties (r) and time trends specific to 
individual wards and counties (rBASETRENDt). BASETRENDt is the time trend. In 
addition, we assume that the Great Kanto Earthquake shifted the share level 
(Xr*AFTERt) and the slope of the trends (Xr*QUAKETRENDt). Here, Xr is the 
indicator of the damage done by the Great Kanto Earthquake in ward or county r. In 
other words, it is assumed that the shift of the share levels and slope of the trends were 
proportionate to the magnitude of the damage. AFTERt is the dummy variable that 
equals 1 for years from 1923 onward, and 0 otherwise. QUAKETRENDt is the time 
trend that equals 0 until 1923 and then 1, 2, 3, etc., to the end of the time series. 
SHARErt is calculated from the data obtained from the various issues of the 
Statistical Yearbook of Tokyo Prefecture (Tokyo-fu Tokeisho). This source provides the 
total number of industrial workers employed by private factories by ward and county for 
1917, 1919, and 19211936. The year 1936 was just before the SinoJapanese War 
broke out, and after that, the government intervened extensively in the economy.27 
For Xr, we use the ratio of completely broken or burnt buildings (BROKENr), the 
ratio of burnt areas (BURNr), and the ratio of the number of deaths and missing people 
(DEATHr). BROKENr and DEATHr are taken from the report by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, and BURNr is taken from a book by a newspaper company.28 In addition to 
these explanatory variables, we add a policy variable. As described in Section 2, as a 
part of the reconstruction plan, in 1925 the government implemented area zoning, 
which had been prepared before the earthquake. As the zoning is considered to affect 
the geographic distribution of industries, we want to control for this effect. In order to 
make a zoning variable, we measure the area of each zone in each ward and county by 
processing a printed city-planning map and combining it with a digital map found in a 
database using Geographic Information Systems (Figure 4). 29 The result of the 
                                                  
26  Interrupted time series analysis is a popular methodology for policy evaluation in the 
field of political science in particular. See, for example, Anderton and Carter “The 
impact” and Evans et al., “The impact.” 
27  Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara eds., Contemporary. 
28  Ministry of Home Affairs, Shinsai ; Chugai Shogyo Shinpo-sha, Zuroku. 
29  Concerning this procedure, see the Appendix.  6
measurement is reported in Table 6. From this table, we make a variable, AREAIr, that 
denotes the ratio of the industrial area to the total area of each ward or county. The 






The estimation results are presented in Table 8. In this table, area dummies and 
area-specific time trends are not reported, although they are included in the model. The 
earthquake damage robustly shifted the level of the worker share, as indicated by the 
negative coefficients of the interaction terms of damage variables and AFTER. 
Meanwhile, it is notable that the magnitude of the level effect is not so large. Given the 
coefficients and the basic statistics, we can say that a one standard deviation change in 
the damage variables is estimated to result in only about a 0.050.11 standard deviation 
change in SHARE. Furthermore, the damage had a positive impact on the slope of the 
share trend. The coefficients of the interaction term of the damage variable and 
QUAKETREND are positive and statistically significant. Comparing the magnitude of 
the level effect and slope effect, we can conclude that the negative level effect was 
cancelled by the positive trend effect within four years. In columns (4) and (5) of Table 8, 
we control for the zone variable (AREAI). It is noted that the results are qualitatively 
the same. Although we want to examine the difference in persistence of the impact 
across industries, sufficiently long time series data on workers are not available by 
industry. Hence, we address this issue by another methodology, namely the unit-root 




We model the logarithms of the shares of the total manufacturing workers in 
different areas in different years as follows: 
 
    rt r rt s     ,     (2) 
 
where  rt s , r  , and rt   denote the log worker share of area r in year t, the log initial 
worker share of area r, and the area-specific shock in area r in year t, respectively. The 
persistence of the shock is modeled as: 
 
1 1     rt rt rt    ,        ( 3 )  
 
where  rt    is the innovation that is assumed to be distributed identically and 
independently.31  By first differencing equation (2) and by using equation (3), we obtain: 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1          rt rt rt rt rt s s       .    (4) 
 
In the context of the paper, this is expressed as: 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( 1922 1936 1923 1923 1936 r r r r r s s             .   (5) 
                                                  
30  Davis and Weinstein, “Bones” and “A Search”; Brakman et al., “The strategic.” 
31  Concerning the validity of this assumption, see footnote 37.  7
 
If we have a valid instrument for the measure of the shock of the earthquake 
(sr1923–sr1922), which serves as νij1923, we can estimate equation (5).32 That is, the 
equation for estimation is: 
 
rt r r r r e s s s s      ) )( 1 ( 1922 1923 1923 1936  .    (6) 
 
In this model, if  = 1, all shocks are permanent and the industrial growth of the areas 
follows a random walk. If  = 0, the shocks are not persistent at all. If 0    1, the 
shocks are persistent for some time, but will dissipate in the long run. Magnitude of  
indicates the speed at which the influence of a temporary shock is dissipated.33 
In addition, given the difference in the recovery process across industries that we 
observed in the previous section, we use another specification that allows for difference 
in     by industry. That is: 
 
  irt i ir ir i ir ir e INDUSTRY s s s s      * ) )( 1 ( 1922 1923 1923 1936  ,   (7) 
 
where INDUSTRYi denotes industry dummy. 
For estimating equations (6) and (7), we compiled the ward- and county-level 
data on industrial workers by industry for the four data points 1915, 1922, 1923, and 
1936. As the data on five industries are available for 15 wards and five counties, there 
are basically 100 observations for each year. However, the numbers of workers were 
zero in two wards for the textile industry and one ward for the chemical industry, and so 
we lost three observations. Consequently, 97 observations were available for the 
empirical analysis. 
As the instrumental variable (IV) for the measure of the shock by the earthquake 
( 1922 1923 r r s s  ) to identify νr1923, we use the ward- and county-level data of the ratio of 
buildings that were completely burnt or destroyed (BROKEN). To test the power of the 
IV, we regressed sr1923 – sr1922 on BROKEN (Table 9). The coefficient of BROKEN has the 
right sign and is statistically significant. At the same time, the R2 is sufficiently large. 
Hence, BROKEN is used as the IV in estimating equation (6). Meanwhile, in order to 
estimate equation (7), we need as many instruments as the number of industries. For 
this purpose, we regressed the measure of the shock by the earthquake (sir1923 – sir1922) 
on BROKEN, industry dummies, and the interaction of BROKEN and the industry 
dummies (Table 9). Multiplying the coefficients of the interaction by industry dummies, 




In order to control for the policy effect of zoning, we add the variable AREAI. We 
also control for the trend of the worker share growth by sr1922 – sr1915 for equation (6) and 
by sir1922 – sir1915 for equation (7). Finally, we add a variable indicating the density of the 
workers at the end of 1922, just before the earthquake (DENSITYr1922), to control for the 
congestion effect. DENSITYr1922 is the total number of industrial workers in area r 
divided by its area. 
                                                  
32  The measure of the shock from the earthquake, 
sr1923 – sr1922 = r1923 – r1922 = r1923+(–1)r1922, is correlated with the error term, 
[r1936 + (–1)r1922]. 
33  Davis and Weinstein, “Bones,” and Brakman et al., “The strategic.” 
34  Davis and Weinstein, “A search.”  8
The estimation results for equation (6) are reported in Table 10. In column (1), 
where no control variable is added, the coefficient of sij1923 – sij1922, namely –1, is fairly 
close to –1, although it is significantly different from –1 at the 10% level.35 In columns 
(2) and (3), we add the density variable and the policy variable. In these cases, the 
coefficient of sij1923 – sij1922 is fairly close to –1 and, furthermore, is not significantly 
different from 1.36 These results suggest that most of the effect from the earthquake 




We now look at the estimation results for equation (7) in Table 11.37 In most 
cases, the interactions between sij1923 – sij1922 and the industry dummies are fairly close 
to –1, except for the case of the machinery and metal industry. Furthermore, for the 
industries other than machinery and metal, the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
not significantly different from –1, except for the chemical industry in column (3). On 
the other hand, for the machinery and metal industry, all the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are significantly different from –1, and are not significantly different 
from 0.38 It is also notable that here the zoning coefficient is positive and strongly 
significant, which indicates that zoning policy substantially affected the spatial 




From the estimation results in this section, we can conclude that the impact of 
the Great Kanto Earthquake on the spatial distribution of industries had basically 
dissipated by 1936, but the impact was persistent for the machinery and metal industry. 
It is notable that this result is consistent with the observation of the descriptive 
statistics in Table 5. 
We now consider the sources of this peculiarity of the machinery and metal 
industry. The first thing we take into account is the higher growth of that industry in 
this period. The number of workers for the machinery and metal industry in Tokyo 
increased 2.52 times from 1922 to 1936, while the total number of industrial workers 
increased 1.60 times.40 The high growth of the machinery and metal industry reflected 
the reconstruction demand after the Earthquake41 as well as the boom in the 1930s. It 
is well known that the boom in the 1930s was led by the development of the machinery 
                                                  
35 F-value  is  3.91. 
36  F-values are 0.640 and 0.775, respectively. 
37 In order to check for spatial autocorrelation, we calculated Moran’s I based on the 
result of column (3). Weak autocorrelation was only observed for the machinery and 
metal industry (at the 10% level). 
38  Concerning the case of column (3), the F-values for testing whether the coefficients of 
the interaction terms of 1922 1923 ir ir s s   with TEXITILE, MACHINERY, CHEMICAL, 
FOODS and MISCELLANEOUS are 2.47, 12.75, 6.12, 2.39, and 0.06, respectively. 
39  The aim of the zoning regulations was to divide the industrial area from the other 
areas to protect the environment. For the details of the relationship between zoning and 
industries, see Numajiri and Imaizumi. 
40  Ministry of International Trade and Industry, p. 214. 
41  A document by the municipal employment agency office states that the labor demand 
for the machinery industry increased beyond the supply just after the earthquake 
(Central Employment Agency Office, “Kanto Daishinsai ni okeru Shokugyo Shokai 
Seiseki”).  9
and metal industry.42 The growth of the industry was accompanied by an increase in 
the number of plants. Indeed, the number of machinery and metal plants increased 3.37 
times in Tokyo, while that of the total manufacturing plants increased 2.56 times.43 
This implies that many new plants were established, especially in the machinery and 
metal industry. Given this fact, the smaller absolute value of 1 for the machinery and 
metal industry may reflect the tendency of new plants to avoid the congestion in Tokyo 
City, even if the general congestion effect was accounted for by using the variable 
DENSITY. 
To check this possibility, we estimated equation (7), substituting  1923 1930 ir ir s s   
for  1923 1936 ir ir s s   to exclude the influence of the high growth of the machinery and 
metal industry in the 1930s. In this case, the coefficients of the interaction terms of 
TEXITILE, MACHINERY, CHEMICAL, FOODS, and MISCELLANEOUS are 0.879, 
0.486, 0.546, 0.871, and 0.881, respectively. In other words, the difference between 
the machinery and metal industry and the other industries is smaller than in the case 
of 1936. This result suggests that the congestion effect on new plants indeed existed. At 
the same time, it is also notable that the difference still remains. 
Second, we consider a particular feature of the industrial organization. In an 
article on the development of the machine tool industry in the 1910s in Japan, Sawai 
pointed out that small and medium-sized machinery and metal industry plants located 
in Tokyo and Osaka were interlinked with one another through various forms of 
outsourcing 44. This observation is supported by a survey on outsourcing in the 
machinery industry by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry conducted in the middle 
of the 1930s.45 The report of the survey states that, “As the machinery industry needs 
large amounts of fixed capital, the industrial organization is naturally characterized by 
extensive division of works. Small and medium-sized firms cannot fill various orders 
with their own equipment, while large firms often prefer outsourcing works or 
purchasing parts to fixing large amounts of capital in specific equipment.”46 
As shown in Panel A of Table 12, machinery firms not only purchased parts from 
outside suppliers, but also outsourced production processes such as casting, forging, and 
machine processing. In addition, Panel B indicates the geographic range of outsourcing 
networks in the machinery industry. In the context of this paper, it is important that the 
networks were mainly intra-prefecture in the largest cities and the largest machinery 
clusters, namely Tokyo and Osaka. Indeed, these outsourcing networks were often 
limited to a county or several wards. We can infer that such outsourcing networks would 
facilitate establishing new plants, as well as enhancing the competitiveness of existing 
plants. In this sense, the outsourcing networks are a source of “centripetal forces” of 
clusters.47 Meanwhile, deliberate cooperation between plants was observed in the 
cluster of the machinery industry.48 Although the share declined, the absolute number 
of machinery and metal workers in Tokyo City in 1936 was larger than in 1922.49 One 
of the reasons for this recovery was the cooperation of existing plants. For example, 
plant owners in Honjo and Fukagawa wards organized “Honjo Fukagawa Kogyo 
Fukkokai” (Association for the Industrial Recovery in Honjo and Fukagawa Wards) in 
                                                  
42  Cha, “Did Korekiyo” and Nakamura, Economic. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Sawai, “Daiichiji,” p.52. 
45  Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kikai Kigu 
46  “Shogen” (Preface) in ibid. 
47  Fujita et al., The Spatial, chapter 3. 
48  Concerning deliberative cooperation in clusters, see Shmitz and Nadvi, “Clustering.” 
49  For the source, see the note to Table 4.  10
September 1923, just after the earthquake, which engaged in such activities as 
distribution of materials.50 This is further evidence that the cluster mattered for the 
machinery and metal industry in this period. 
These features such as outsourcing networks and deliberate cooperation in 
clusters are endogenous sources of agglomeration economies and, as such, are the 
source of the stability of a spatial equilibrium. On the other hand, if a temporary shock 
changes the spatial distribution of these features, the economy will shift to a new 
spatial equilibrium. Concerning the case of the machinery and metal industry in Tokyo, 
the rapid growth of the industry in the suburban counties just after the earthquake 
arguably strengthened the agglomeration economies there to cause a persistent shift of 




5. Concluding Remarks 
The Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 was truly a great shock to the Japanese economy. 
Whereas the ratio of the damage from the earthquake to the GNP was around one-third 
of that from W orld W ar II, the damage from the former was concentrated in T okyo 
Prefecture and Kanagawa Prefecture, indeed around 40% of the buildings in Tokyo 
Prefecture were completely burnt or destroyed. In this paper, we investigate the 
long-run impact of a temporary shock on the geographic distribution of industries in 
Tokyo Prefecture using the Great Kanto Earthquake as a natural experiment. This 
research strategy has three advantages. First, the earthquake is a purely exogenous 
event. Second, within Tokyo Prefecture, while the temporary shock had large spatial 
variation, the variation of fundamental conditions was not as large as for the whole of 
Japan, which may have made the effect of the temporary shock persistent. Finally, we 
investigate persistence by industry. 
It was revealed that the impact of the temporary shock from the Great Kanto 
Earthquake had basically dissipated by 1936. This result is consistent with the 
literature that tests the persistence of the impact of temporary shocks, and supports the 
view that the geographic distribution of economic activity is principally determined by 
the first nature (Davis and Weinstein 2002, 2008; Brakman et al. 2004). On the other 
hand, with respect to the machinery and metal industry, once the clusters were 
damaged by the earthquake, this shock gave a persistent impact on the spatial 
distribution of workers. This finding suggests the importance of the industrial 
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To obtain the area of each zone in each ward and county we took the following procedure.     
First, the city planning map of Tokyo City51 is scanned into six tiled digital images.  
Second, the images are rectified52 into the real world coordinates, i.e. to fit the 
remaining roads and landmarks on a digital map of Tokyo53 found within GIS.  Third, 
a digital zoning map is created by digitizing the shapes of each zone onto the rectified 
city planning map images. Finally, the digital zoning map is overlaid with the digital 
map database of ward and county boundaries in 192354, and the overlapping areas are 
                                                  
51  Tokyo Toshi-keikaku Chiiki-zu (City Planning Zoning Map of Tokyo), City Planning 
Office, Bureau of Audit, Tokyo City Government, 1936. 
52  Geometric correction using affine transformation 
53  Digital Map 25000 [Spatial Data Framework], Geographical Survey Institute of 
Japan, 2003.    A coordinate transformation from a Geodetic Coordinate System into a 
Plane Rectangular Coordinate System 2001 zone IX on GIS is required in our process. 
54  Yuji Murayama, Administrative boundary digital map after the Meiji period  13
computed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  






Death Missing Total Ratio to the
population
Total 11,743,100 91,344 13,275 104,619 0.89
Tokyo  4,035,700 59,593 10,904 70,497 1.75
   Tokyo City 2,265,300 58,104 10,556 68,660 3.03
   The other area 1,770,400 1,489 348 1,837 0.10
Kanagawa 1,379,000 29,614 2,245 31,859 2.31
   Yokohama City 446,600 21,384 1,951 23,335 5.23
   The other area 932,400 8,230 294 8,524 0.91
Chiba 1,347,200 1,373 47 1,420 0.11
Saitama 1,353,800 280 36 316 0.02
Shizuoka 1,626,300 450 42 492 0.03
Yamanashi 602,000 20 0 20 0.00
Ibaraki 1,399,100 14 1 15 0.00










Total 2,284,200 381,090 83,819 464,909 20.4
Tokyo  826,600 311,962 16,684 328,646 39.8
     Tokyo City 483,000 300,924 4,222 305,146 63.2
     The other area 343,600 11,038 12,462 23,500 6.8
Kanagawa 274,300 68,634 46,719 115,353 42.1
     Yokohama City 98,900 62,608 9,800 72,408 73.2
     The other area 175,400 6,026 36,919 42,945 24.5
Chiba 262,600 478 12,894 13,372 5.1
Saitama 244,900 0 4,562 4,562 1.9
Shizuoka 289,100 16 2,241 2,257 0.8
Yamanashi 117,000 0 562 562 0.5
Ibaraki 269,700 0 157 157 0.1
Source: Tokyo City Government, Shinsai, p.161.Table 3 Estimated amount of the damage
Amount (1,000 yen) Percentage
7 prefectures Tokyo City Yokohama City 7 prefectures Tokyo City Yokohama City
Total 5,506,386 3,662,163 903,538 100.0 100.0 100.0
Ports 7,748 1,133 5,350 0.1 0.0 0.6
Embankments 39,486 0 10,140 0.7 0.0 1.1
Roads 22,660 2,018 6,839 0.4 0.1 0.8
Bridges 14,137 7,748 4,765 0.3 0.2 0.5
Water-works 13,827 10,129 3,049 0.3 0.3 0.3
Sewers 2,312 1,172 1,140 0.0 0.0 0.1
Ships 12,215 8,065 3,735 0.2 0.2 0.4
Equipments for electricity 43,004 39,238 3,760 0.8 1.1 0.4
Buildings 1,874,715 1,112,113 249,007 34.0 30.4 27.6
Household goods 869,469 627,589 128,034 15.8 17.1 14.2
Factories 238,264 164,320 40,472 4.3 4.5 4.5
Commodities 2,030,098 1,601,301 427,952 36.9 43.7 47.4
Inventory 106,637 87,340 19,297 1.9 2.4 2.1
Others 231,813 0 0 4.2 0.0 0.0
Source: Tokyo City Government, Shinsai, p.9Table 4 Changes in geographic distribution of industrial workers in Tokyo
Number of workers Percentage
1922 1923 1936 1922 1923 1936
Total 183,521 119,012 376,718 100.00 100.00 100.00
Tokyo City Kojimachi Ward 2,335 1,671 4,008 1.27 1.40 1.06
Kanda Ward 5,984 1,435 7,676 3.26 1.21 2.04
Nihonbashi Ward 2,075 552 3,105 1.13 0.46 0.82
Kyobashi Ward 13,914 2,154 12,810 7.58 1.81 3.40
Shiba Ward 15,684 6,456 23,955 8.55 5.42 6.36
Azabu Ward 2,567 2,486 4,019 1.40 2.09 1.07
Akasaka Ward 421 568 844 0.23 0.48 0.22
Yotsuya Ward 675 834 934 0.37 0.70 0.25
Ushigome Ward 2,838 3,216 4,668 1.55 2.70 1.24
Koishikawa Ward 6,300 6,835 6,641 3.43 5.74 1.76
Hongo Ward 2,388 1,611 3,397 1.30 1.35 0.90
Shitaya Ward 3,227 1,827 6,564 1.76 1.54 1.74
Asakusa Ward 3,471 866 9,486 1.89 0.73 2.52
Honjo Ward 23,206 7,613 31,582 12.64 6.40 8.38
Fukagawa Ward 13,525 2,176 12,670 7.37 1.83 3.36
Counties Ebara County 15,284 15,205 83,059 8.33 12.78 22.05
Toyotama County 6,121 4,985 18,219 3.34 4.19 4.84
Kitatoshima County 25,205 24,085 59,885 13.73 20.24 15.90
Minami Adachi County 1,693 1,610 10,778 0.92 1.35 2.86
Minami Katushika County 36,608 32,827 72,418 19.95 27.58 19.22
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Tokyo City, 1924 issue and 1925 issue; Statistical Yearbook of Industries in Tokyo City, 1938 issue.
Note: Shadow indicates the areas whose share declined more than 50% from 1922 to 1923. Bold letters sindicate the areas whose 
        share did not recover the half of the decline from 1922 to 1923, by 1936.Table 5 Changes in the distribution of industrial workers by industry (percentage)
Textile Machinery and metal
1922 1923 1936 1922 1923 1936
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Tokyo City Kojimachi Ward 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.52 0.20 0.28
Kanda Ward 0.70 0.16 0.44 1.64 1.44 0.83
Nihonbashi Ward 0.39 0.11 0.56 0.34 0.18 0.17
Kyobashi Ward 0.23 0.09 0.12 9.68 1.53 3.52
Shiba Ward 0.45 0.09 0.19 18.89 14.63 9.14
Azabu Ward 0.33 0.36 0.34 2.66 4.58 1.50
Akasaka Ward 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.49 0.11
Yotsuya Ward 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.32 0.44 0.05
Ushigome Ward 0.25 0.35 0.28 0.54 0.85 0.24
Koishikawa Ward 1.04 1.29 1.23 2.35 3.90 0.70
Hongo Ward 0.27 0.22 0.20 1.44 1.58 0.58
Shitaya Ward 1.28 0.52 0.92 1.56 1.91 1.25
Asakusa Ward 0.91 0.15 1.32 1.87 0.86 1.74
Honjo Ward 10.72 3.55 12.16 15.77 8.79 8.36
Fukagawa Ward 4.69 0.04 1.28 7.26 1.41 2.76
Counties Ebara County 5.54 6.62 8.53 10.66 18.09 31.87
Toyotama County 0.95 0.93 3.02 5.89 7.06 4.68
Kitatoshima County 25.38 28.24 24.93 8.02 15.30 13.41
Minami Adachi County 0.57 1.33 6.94 0.26 0.16 1.39
Minami Katushika County 46.12 55.69 37.48 10.11 16.61 17.43
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Tokyo City, 1924 issue and 1925 issue; Statistical Yearbook of Industries in Tokyo City, 1938 issue.
Note: Shadow indicates the areas whose share declined more than 50% from 1922 to 1923. Bold letters sindicate the areas whose 
        share did not recover the half of the decline from 1922 to 1923, by 1936.Table 6 Percentage of zones by ward and county
%
Industrial Commercial Residential Not designated
Kojimachi Ward 0.0 34.0 66.0 0.0
Kanda Ward 0.0 84.3 15.7 0.0
Nihonbashi Ward 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Kyobashi Ward 0.0 72.7 0.0 27.3
Shiba Ward 0.0 35.3 50.4 14.3
Azabu Ward 0.0 1.7 97.8 0.5
Akasaka Ward 0.0 4.4 95.6 0.0
Yotsuya Ward 0.0 15.5 84.5 0.0
Ushigome Ward 0.0 1.5 98.5 0.0
Koishikawa Ward 0.0 0.9 99.1 0.0
Hongo Ward 0.0 4.3 95.7 0.0
Shitaya Ward 0.8 47.5 50.6 1.1
Asakusa Ward 5.0 81.0 14.0 0.0
Honjo Ward 68.7 2.9 15.9 12.5
Fukagawa Ward 82.6 2.8 0.0 14.6
Ebara County 21.8 1.3 75.8 1.2
Toyotama County 0.0 1.4 97.9 0.7
Kitatoshima County 32.3 0.9 63.8 3.0
Minami Adachi County 45.6 0.4 43.3 10.7
Minami Katushika County 67.5 0.1 32.4 0.0
Note: see the text.Table 7 Basic statistics
Mean Stdev Min Max
SHARE 0.045 0.051 0.001 0.270
AREAI 0.165 0.271 0.000 0.800
BROKEN 0.417 0.380 0.011 0.932
BURN 0.312 0.372 0.000 0.959
DEATH 0.014 0.039 0.000 0.181Table 8 Interruption in the level and slope of worker share by the Great Kanto Earthquake
Dependent variable: SHARE
(1) (2) (3)
BROKEN*AFTER -0.0070 -1.76 *
BROKEN*QUAKETREND 0.0018 1.87 *
BURN*AFTER -0.011 -2.67 ***
BURN*QUAKETREND 0.003 3.24 ***
DEATH*AFTER -0.143 -2.35 **
DEATH*QUAKETREND 0.036 2.74 ***
R-sq 0.902 0.903 0.904
Obs. 360 360 360
Dependent variable: SHARE
(4) (5) (6)
BROKEN*AFTER -0.010 -1.96 *
BROKEN*QUAKETREND 0.002 1.54
BURN*AFTER -0.015 -2.69 ***
BURN*QUAKETREND 0.003 2.79 ***
DEATH*AFTER -0.199 -2.85 ***
DEATH*QUAKETREND 0.031 2.33 **
AREAI 0.022 1.07 0.023 1.14 0.025 1.23
R-sq 0.903 0.904 0.904
Obs. 360 360 360
Note: Area dummies and area specific time trends are included, although not reported (see the text).
        Heteroschedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
        *** statistically significant at 1% level.
        **   statistically significant at 5% level.
        *   statistically significant at 10% level.Table 9 Instrumenting equations
Dependent variable sr1923-sr1922 sir1923-sir1922
sr1922-sr1915 0.036 (0.075)
sir1922-sir1915 0.005 (0.078)
BROKEN -1.839 (0.075) ***
BROKEN*TEXITILE -2.373 (0.368) ***
BROKEN*MACHINERY -1.487 (0.366) ***
BROKEN*CHENICAL -1.889 (0.361) ***
BROKEN*FOODS -1.866 (0.359) ***
BROKEN*MISCELLANEOUS -1.626 (0.364) ***
TEXITILE 0.401 (0.218) *
MACHINERY 0.493 (0.205) **
CHENICAL 0.348 (0.205) *
FOODS 0.641 (0.208) ***
MISCELLANEOUS 0.734 (0.209) ***
Constant
Number of obs. 97 97
R
2 0.565 0.664
Note: Heteroschedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
        *** statistically significant at 1% level.
        **   statistically significant at 5% level.
        *   statistically significant at 10% level.Table 10 Test on the persistence of the effect of the Great Kanto Earthquake
Dependent variable: sr1936-sr1923
(1) (2) (3)
sｒ1923-sｒ1922 -0.670 (0.167) *** -0.880 (0.251) *** -0.927 (0.250) ***
sr1922-sr1915 -0.280 (0.409) -0.135 (0.420)
DENSITY1922 -0.290 (-1.74) -0.341 (0.169) *
AREAIi 0.480 (00.398)
Constant -0.067 (0.107) 0.157 (0.164) 0.113 (0.166)
Number of obs. 20 20 20
R
2 0.528 0.625 0.659
Note: Heteroschedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
       *** statistically significant at 1% level.
       *   statistically significant at 10% level.Table 11 Test on the persistence of the effect of the Great Kanto Earthquake by industry
Dependent variable: sir1923-sir1936
(1) (2) (3)
(sir1923-sir1922)*TEXITILE -0.766 (0.149) *** -0.846 (0.169) *** -0.864 (0.183) ***
(sir1923-sir1922)*MACHINERY -0.189 (0.227) -0.261 (0.270) -0.302 (0.261)
(sir1923-sir1922)*CHEMICAL -0.578 (0.171) *** -0.618 (0.208) *** -0.638 (0.231) ***
(sir1923-sir1922)*FOODS -0.729 (0.174) *** -0.841 (0.190) *** -0.876 (0.207) ***
(sir1923-sir1922)*MISCELLANEOUS -0.924 (0.311) *** -1.064 (0.322) *** -1.117 (0.354) ***
srj1922-sir1915 -0.099 (0.130) -1.003 (0.133)
DENSITY1922 -0.196 (0.102) * -0.291 (0.108) ***
AREAIi 0.870 (0.287) ***
Constant -0.059 (0.092) 0.143 (0.118) 0.077 (0.112)
Number of obs. 97 97 97
R
2 0.409 0.444 0.498
Note: Heteroschedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
       *** statistically significant at 1% level.
       *   statistically significant at 10% level.Table 12 Organization of machinery industry (1934)




Outsourcing works 84,247 12.7
  Casting 22,951 3.5
  Making wooden forms 1,045 0.2
  Machine processing 25,244 3.8
  Sheet processing 4,339 0.7
  Forging 4,108 0.6
  Heat treatment 460 0.1
  Plating 1,046 0.2
  Other processes 25,054 3.8
Purchasing parts 79,271 12.0






  Tokyo Prefecture 82.1 17.9
  Kanagawa Prefecture 7.7 92.3
  Aichi Prefecture 61.2 38.8
  Osaka Prefecture 87.4 12.6
  Hyogo Prefecture 48.5 51.5
  Hiroshima Prefecture 60.5 39.5
  Fukuoka Prefecture 85.6 14.4
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kikai Kigu, p.Vi, p.6.
Location of
Location of